“Intention”: War for the Han Frontier sample (Act I) -- T. P. M. Thorne

5

Yuan Shao’s court in his Ji Provincial capital of Yè City was condemned to be a sombre place since his infamous historic defeat at Guandu. Tens of thousands of soldiers had died, been captured or defected to Cao Cao’s Han forces in the chaos that followed: in addition to that, Yuan had lost a large number of talented advisers and officers.
     At the start of the campaign against Cao Cao’s regime in Xuchang City, Yuan Shao had enjoyed more than just a numerical advantage: none but the most shrewd - and aware of Yuan’s nature - would have expected the outcome. Firstly, Yuan had prestige and great wealth: his ancestors had been trusted vassals in the Imperial court in Luoyang, and one of his more influential ancestors, Yuan An, had the rare honour of being commemorated with statues; Shao’s wealth was such that he could simultaneously fight a 7-year campaign against his brother Yuan Shu and the northern warlord Gongsun Zan and still have the financial security to launch an immediate campaign against Cao Cao in the aftermath. Secondly, Yuan had one of the largest pools of military talent: Generals Yan Liang, Wen Chou and Zhang Hè were only outclassed by the likes of the prodigy Lü Bu; he had a Wuhuan cavalry force that few could match after a serious famine five years earlier; and he had dozens of advisers while others typically had a handful. Thirdly, he had a strong list of third-party supporters: the itinerant warlord Liu Bei, Jing Governor Liu Biao and the north-eastern Wuhuan tribes were publicly united behind him, while the bandit kin Gong Du of Yu, the Yellow Turbans of Runan and a faction of rebellious officials in the capital led by General of Chariots and Cavalry Dong Cheng were silent partners and the southern warlord Sun Ce was said to be considering his own march against Xuchang after deciding that Cao Cao was a threat to his own vision for the south. Fourthly, Yuan Shao enjoyed near-total control of Bing, Ji, Qing and Yòu Provinces and all the resources that those provinces offered.

     By contrast, Yuan Shao’s opponent Cao Cao was on the defensive. Cao Cao had an army of only a quarter of the size of Yuan’s that was tired after simultaneous campaigns against a rebel faction of Southern Xiongnu warriors, the Yellow Turbans of Runan, the warlord Lü Bu, Zang Ba’s Mount Tai Bandits and the pretender Yuan Shu. Further to that, the capital Xuchang was surrounded on all sides, the construction of Xuchang’s imperial palace and the restoration of Luoyang had drained the already-strained treasury, and the Han enjoyed only limited control over Xu, Yu and Yan Provinces. As a final, apparently deadly blow, Dong Cheng’s plotters were found to be in possession of an imperial edict - the so-called ‘Girdle Edict’ - that condemned Cao Cao as a traitor and called upon the nation to destroy him.
     But from the beginning, Yuan Shao was actually doomed: Cao Cao’s counsel provided sound advice that led to the exposure of Dong Cheng’s conspiracy, enabling Cao to dismiss the edict as a forgery and damage the campaign; Yuan Shao and his allies repeatedly hesitated and failed to coordinate, allowing Cao Cao to make better use of his limited resources and eliminate certain problems one at a time; Sun Ce was assassinated - some said coincidentally, others suspected Cao’s involvement - and Ce’s successor Sun Quan quickly made it clear that he would not march against the capital; and Yuan’s large assembly of advisers quickly proved to be more of a hindrance than a help as they conspired against each other to further their own careers and offered contradictory advice that often led to crippling defeats.

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